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Abstract  
The effectiveness of boards of directors is addressed in a context of weak legal 
protection using a sample of listed firms from Southern. A cross-country and 
panel data design is used, taking into account the endogeneity problem arising in 
studies of corporate governance. The results show that there is an inverted U-
shaped relationship between independent directors and firm performance which 
allows us to identify the optimal level of independent directors on the board. 
Moreover, the study determines whether there are significant differences in the 
optimal level of independent directors depending on the family identity of the 
large shareholder and whether any such differences are correlated with firm 
performance. This article has implications for practitioners because the results fail 
to support good the governance recommendation suggesting that more 
independent directors are always in the best interest of investors. 
Key Words: corporate governance, independent directors, weak investor 
protection, large family shareholders, performance, endogeneity. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In last decades, several recommendations with regard to board structure for public 
corporations have been made and written into codes of good governance. A 
common theme is the agency theory perspective, which seeks to strengthen the 
role of monitoring boards. The emphasis of these codes on the monitoring 
function of boards is aligned with the focus of agency theory in much of the 
literature on boards of directors. However, related empirical evidence is 
inconclusive, and there is limited guidance for policymakers seeking to identify 
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governance practices that result in more effective firm performance (Finegold et 
al., 2007).  
A key aspect of firm governance is ownership structure, including the typology of 
the firm’s shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). 
In this paper we determine the optimal level of independent directors on the 
board, a feature of the structure of boards that have been identified as central to 
the development of good corporate governance in organisations. Moreover, we 
test whether there are significant differences in the optimal level of independent 
directors when the large shareholder is a family. Data from the Southern European 
business sector enable us to analyse the impact of corporate governance on firm 
performance in a context in which large shareholders are common and a 
significant number of firms are controlled by family groups.  
2. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Following Hillman and Dalziel (2003), we consider that boards of directors serve 
two important roles: monitoring the management on behalf of shareholders and 
providing resources.  
Whether independent directors have an impact on firm performance is one of the 
most debated and researched areas of corporate governance, although empirical 
evidence offers no conclusive results. There is some evidence of a positive 
relationship (e.g., Baysinger and Butler, 1985), a negative relationship (e.g., 
Bhagat and Bolton, 2008) and a nonsignificant relationship (e.g., Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1991) between these two variables. In an attempt to explain these 
conflicting findings, Dalton et al. (1998) conducted meta-analyses of the research 
on board composition and performance and did not find evidence of a link 
between independent directors and firm performance. 
Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) implies that adequate monitoring 
mechanisms need to be established to protect shareholders from management’s 
opportunistic behaviours which maximize their own self-interests. From this 
perspective, those who most effectively engage in monitoring on boards are 
independent directors due to the few conflicts of interest they face (Dalton et al., 
1999). Thus, if the monitoring function takes precedence over the provision of 
resources, we expect a positive relationship between company performance and 
board independence.   
Independent director appointments can also be relevant to the provision of 
resources by the board because such directors can provide comprehensive and 
complementary outside knowledge (mostly based on university training and 
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outside work experience) that can be used by management teams in formulating 
and implementing strategies (Daily and Dalton, 1993). Nevertheless, a board 
made up entirely of independent directors could not efficiently work in this 
capacity because it would lack experience with and knowledge of key aspects of 
the firm and its environment and would have difficulty acquiring this necessary 
firm-specific knowledge (McVey et al., 2005). Executive directors spend their 
working lives at the company they help to direct, so they are a valuable source of 
experience with business operations and firm-specific knowledge related to the 
functioning of the company. This experience makes them able to provide 
resources efficiently (Donaldson and Davis, 1994; Raheja, 2005). Executive 
directors also facilitate the transfer of information between the board and the 
management team. As a result, proponents of stewardship theory contend that 
superior corporate performance will be linked to a high ratio of executive 
directors to independent directors because the former naturally work to maximise 
profit for shareholders. 
Because maximising firm performance requires a board to perform effectively in 
all areas (Baysinger and Butler, 1985), we expect that an appropriate mix of 
executive and independent directors may be best for a board. We have formulated 
our hypothesis as follows:   
Hypothesis 1: There is an inverted u-shaped relationship between independent 
directors and firm performance.  
A large family shareholder can exercise control by controlling its board of 
directors and/or by assuming the executive functions of board members 
(Bammens et al., 2010). Large family shareholders are less likely than nonfamily 
investors to incorporate independent directors into their boards (Schulze et al., 
2001). The first reason for this is that family owners associate a loss of control 
and discretion with independent directors. The second is that although 
independent directors may improve the provision of external resources, they have 
little influence on decision making involving family members. Moreover, if 
controlling families are motivated to expropriate minority shareholders, they will 
have an incentive to limit monitoring by any independent directors they appoint. 
Thus, large family shareholders tend to choose directors who are not truly 
independent (because they have a friendly or contractual relationship with the 
company), therefore compromising board independence (Lane et al., 2006). 
Moreover, scholars identified stewardship theory as potentially being highly 
applicable to the realm of large family shareholders, characterized by 
involvement-oriented management philosophies, strong firm identification, low 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT STUDIES 





reliance on institutional powers, and personal and social fulfilment (Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003; Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2006). From this perspective, any form 
of direct or indirect control may lower stewards’ motivation, negatively affecting 
their pro-organisational behaviour. Therefore, we expect independent directors to 
be less effective in their monitoring role in those firms which have a large family 
shareholder.  
In addition, close ties to agents do encourage the provision of resources by boards 
(Hillman and Dalzield, 2003). Compared with non family shareholders, family 
managers are said to have an advantage with regard to firm-specific knowledge 
(Bammens et al., 2010), and they have been associated with specific dynamics in 
terms of knowledge management transmission (Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001). 
Family managers tend to guard their privacy and to be very careful in choosing 
those with whom they share confidential information. Thus, it is expensive to 
transfer specific knowledge about the company to independent directors and 
executives are preferred (Lane et al., 2006).  
Bearing in mind the arguments presented above, we expect the presence of a large 
family shareholders to influence the relationship between independent directors 
and firm performance. Therefore, we have formulated the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: The effect of independent directors on firm performance will be 
different in firms which have a large family shareholder. 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Sample and variables  
The empirical analysis conducted is based on a sample of non-financial, publicly 
traded firms from Spain, Portugal and Italy during the 2001-2007 period. We 
chose these countries because they are framed within the tradition of French Civil 
Law, and thus, both the ownership concentration and the proportion of family 
controlling shareholders tend to be higher than in countries whose legal systems 
originated from Common Law due to the lower level of protection of shareholder 
interests in the former (La Porta et al., 1999).  
We constructed a database based on information provided by the supplier Bureau 
Van Dyjk, the stock market regulators, the stock exchanges and the company 
websites. We only included firms with an ultimate owner1(García-Ramos and 
                                               
1 Because our aim was to obtain a sample that was as homogeneous as possible and would thus allow us to link the 
differences found to the identity of the controlling shareholder and not to the level of concentration of property rights. We 
used control chain methodology to identify firms´ owners (La Porta et al., 1999). We considered a company to have an 
ultimate owner if the main shareholder directly or indirectly held a percentage of sahres greater than or equal to 25%. On 
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García-Olalla, 2011). For a business to qualify as a family firm, we required 
family members not only to control at least 25% of property rights2 but also to be 
actively involved in the control and/or management of the firm. Correspondingly, 
we divided the sample into two groups, those own and controlled by a family and 
those with a nonfamily large shareholder. After we had applied necessary filters3, 
the number of companies included in the sample was 212, 34% were own-






Market-to-book value ratio (Q)4: the book value of total assets minus the book 
value of common equity plus the market value of common equity divided by 




The number of independent directors divided by the total number of directors 
on the board of each company. 
Independent 
directors2 
We included the square variable for independent directors to test for the 
existence of the inverted u-shaped relationship proposed in our hypothesis. 
CONTROL5 
Lag Q The lag value of Tobin´s Q. 
Firm size Natural logarithm of the total value of assets 
Firm debt Quotient between total debt and assets 
Firm age Natural logarithm of the number of years since the firm's constitution 
Yearx Dummy variables (value of “1” when the sample observation corresponds to 
year “x” and “0” otherwise) 
Countryy Dummy variables (value “1” when the firm belongs to country “y” and “0” 
otherwise)  
Sectorz Dummy variables (value “1” when the firm belongs to sector “z”, and “0” 
otherwise) 
INTERACTIVE 
Family Dummy variable that takes the value “1” if the firm is own-controlled by a 
family and “0” otherwise 
                                                                                                                                
the basis of these criteria, all of the firms in our sample have a concentrated ownership structure. 
2 We chose this threshold for two reasons. First, whereas the existing literature on the USA used levels of 10% and 20%, 
we tried to adjust to the more concentrated ownership structures of most European countries. Second, we sought to 
maintain consistency with the official definition of a family business in Europe as approved in 2008 by two international 
institutions representing family businesses, the European Group of Owner Managed and Family Enterprises (GEEF) and 
the Board of the Family Business Network. 
3 We only included those firms for which information was available on all of the variables considered for a sufficient 
number of years according to the econometric technique used. We needed available data for at least five consecutive years 
within the 2001-2007 period to test the second-order serial correlation (Blundell and Bond, 1998), which is fundamental to 
guaranteeing the robustness of the estimations made via the GMM System methodology. 
4 It is common in corporate governance literature on the use of this or similar measures as the dependent variable (Andrés et 
al., 2005; Cheng, 2008; Jackling and Johl, 2009). 
5 Control variables that influence firm value are included to avoid any bias in the results, consistent with prior studies of 
corporate governance and performance (Andrés et al., 2005; Cheng, 2008; Jackling and Johl, 2009). 
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Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the full sample.  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Q-Tobin   .10 16.20   1.41 1.06 
Independent directors    .00   1.00  .31   .21 
Firm size 6.32 20.56 13.66 2.44 
Firm debt .02   1.00  .61   .20 
Firm age   .00   5.04    3.28   .95 
 
3.2. Model estimation 
The econometric approach used to test our hypotheses is panel data, which allows 
us to account for individual unobservable heterogeneities between different 
companies and to eliminate the risk of obtaining biased results. To address the 
endogeneity problem that arises in our analysis, we used the generalised method 
of moments system estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998).  
Using the above methodology and in order to test hypothesis 1, we proposed a 
model that explained company performance in accordance with the explicative 
variable related to the board of directors and the control variables considered. To 
determine to what extent the relationship between independent directors and firm 
performance is affected by the family identity of the large shareholder (hypothesis 
2), the moderator variable family was introduced in the model interactively. The 
estimated model is as follows: 
Qi,t = + 1 INDEPENDENT DIRECTORSit  + 2 (INDEPENDENT DIRECTORSit  x 
FAMILY)+ 3 INDEPENDENT DIRECTORSit2 + 4 (INDEPENDENT DIRECTORSit2  x  
FAMILY)+ 5 LAG Q6  FIRM SIZEit + 7  FIRM DEBTit +  8  FIRM AGEit + 
(YEARCOUNTRYi + SECTORi + vit) 
Additionally, and in order to find the optimal level of board independence in our 
sample, we derive the optimal level of independent directors at which the firm 
performance is maximized. To that end, we solve for the first derivative of 
performance with respect to independent directors
 4. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
 The results of the model estimations are reported in Table 2. The joint Wald tests 
of the overall statistical significance of the model confirm the validity of our 
model (876.36 with p<.001). The AR2 tests confirm the absence of second-order 
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serial correlation6 (-.70 with p>.1). Finally, the Hansen tests confirm the validity 
of the instruments we used to avoid the endogeneity problem (38.82 with p>.1). 
Table 2.   Results of the panel data regression model 
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q   
(Constant) 1.810 *** 
Independent directors .908 ** 
Independent directors  x Family ownership structure -1.410 ** 
Independent directors2 -1.886 *** 
Independent directors2  x Family ownership structure 1.992 *** 
Lag Q .420 *** 
Firm debt .103  
Firm size -.048 ** 
Firm age -.098 ** 
Yearx(6) Yes *** 
Countryy(2) Yes * 
Sectorz(7) Yes *** 
Tests of significance:   
YEAR –test 64.70 *** 
COUNTRY –test  3.44 * 
SECTOR –test  63.18 *** 
Z1 –test  1.65 * 
Z2 –test  .63  
JOINT F-test 876.36 *** 
Instruments validity test:   
Hansen 38.82 (.478) 
Autocorrelation test:   
AR(1) -2.42 (.015)** 
AR(2) -.70 (.485) 
* p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. Yes: inclusion of dummy variables. YEAR –test: Wald test of the joint significance of the year's 
dummy variables; COUNTRY –test: Wald test of the joint significance of the countries’ dummy variables; SECTOR –test: 
Wald test of the joint significance of the sector's dummy variables. Z1-test: Wald statistic for the linear restriction test under 
the null hypothesis H0: 1+2=0 [H0: independent directors+(independent directors x family ownership)=0]. Z2-test: Wald 
statistic for the linear restriction test under the null hypothesis H0: 3+4=0 [H0: independent directors2+(independent 
directors2 x family ownership)=0]. JOINT F-test: F test of the joint significance of the variables in the model, under the null 
hypothesis of lack of relationship. Hansen: over-identifying restriction test, distributed as a chi-square under the null 
hypothesis of no relation between the instruments and the error term. AR(1) and AR(2) are the second order serial 
correlation statistic using residuals in first differences, under the null hypothesis of non-serial correlation. 
Our model allows us to identify the effect of independent directors on firm 
performance for the two subgroups of firms under consideration, those owned and 
controlled by a family and those with a large non-family shareholder7. The effect 
                                               
6 Given the use of first-difference transformations, we expected some degree of first-order serial correlation (test AR1), and 
this correlation does not invalidate our results. However, the presence of second-order serial correlation does signal omitted 
variables. 
7 The coefficients for each subgroup are the result of the sum of the coefficient for the direct variable plus the moderator 
effect: direct variable + (direct variable x family). The dummy variable family takes the value 1 for family own-controlled 
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of independent directors on firm performance is non-linear. The positive and 
significant coefficient of the variable independent directors (β1=.908 and p<.05) 
and the negative and significant coefficient of the variable independent directors2 
(β3=-1.886 and p<.01) confirm that there exists an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between independent directors and firm performance as stated in hypothesis 1. 
The moderator terms show that the incremental effect for family own-controlled 
firms with respect to firms with a large nonfamily shareholder is negative and 
significant for independent directors (β2=-1.410 and p<.05) and positive and 
significant for independent directors2 (β4=1.992 and p<.01). Therefore, the 
relationship between independent directors on the boards and firm performance 
depends on the family nature of the large shareholder. This result allows us to 
accept hypothesis 2. For family own-controlled firms the coefficients of 
independent directors (β1+β2=.908+(-1.410)=-.502), which the Wald-tests show to 
be significant (Z1=1.65 and p<.1), and independent directors2 (β3+β4=-
1.886+1.992=.106), which the Wald-tests show to be non-significant (Z2=.63 and 
p>.1), indicate that the effect of independent directors on firm performance is 
negative. 
With the estimated coefficients we optimally derive the breakpoint at which the 
relation between independent directors and firm performance turns from positive 
to negative in firms with a large nonfamily shareholder8. The optimal level of 
independent directors that maximizes firm performance is 24.07%.  
Our results are robust to the inclusion of control variables. We find that whereas 
the effects of firm size and firm age on firm performance are negative, the effect 
of firm debt is not significant. Year, country and sector effects are also significant.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Our study highlights the different role played by independent directors depending 
on the identity of the large shareholder of the firm. The inverted u-shaped 
relationship between board independence and firm performance found in firms 
with a large nonfamily shareholder reinforces the argument that an adequate 
combination of executives and independent directors is better than excessive 
                                                                                                                                
firms and 0 otherwise. The coefficients of the direct variables therefore represent the effect of independent directors on the 
performance of firms with a large nonfamily shareholder. The coefficients of the moderator effects include the incremental 
effects of each board variable (independent directors and independent directors2) on the performance of family own-
controlled firms with respect to the reference group, those with a large nonfamily shareholder. The coefficient for family 
owned-controlled firms equals the sum of the coefficient for firms with a large nonfamily shareholder plus the moderator 
effect. 
8 Because the effect of independent directors2 on firm performance is not significant in family own-controlled firms, we 
cannot derive the breakpoint. 
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independence as a means of helping firms achieve better performance. On the 
other hand, the adverse effect of independent directors on the performance of 
family own-controlled firms indicates the lower effectiveness of independent 
directors in terms of monitoring and providing resources in the presence of large 
family shareholders. With regard to large family shareholders, consistent with 
stewardship theory, capital markets appear to view more insiders on the board as 
positive. When the presence of independent directors has a negative effect, this 
may simply suggest that there are more independent directors than is optimal, 
which would prevent the expected positive relationship from being empirically 
observed. One possible reason that boards may continue to be allowed excessive 
independence is that good governance recommendations essentially advocate this. 
These results force us to reconsider and reshape the empirical links traditionally 
evidenced in the financial literature between performance and independent 
directors in widely held firms because this study contradicts the widespread belief 
that more independent boards are always more effective. Although 
recommendations regarding governance mechanisms are based on agency 
settings, this research show that where there is a large family shareholder, 
stewardship theory-based governance mechanisms lead to better corporate 
performance. Indeed, less independent boards are tied to better performance by 
the family own-controlled firms in our sample.  
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